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ABSTRACT 
In many countries today, the introduction of competitive supply and corresponding 
organizational separation of supply, transmission, and system operation has resulted in more 
highly stressed operating conditions, more vulnerable networks, and an increased need to 
identify the security level of the power system in both operating and planning scheme. There 
are two approaches used to assess the security level. One of them, the deterministic approach, 
I 
. is widely utilized in industry to perform security evaluation of power: system operation by 
providing a basis for determining tradeoffs between security and economy. The .other one, 
the probabilistic approach, can enhance this decision-making process by quantitatively 
assessing a number of uncertainties. In the thesis, we compare the deterministic approach to a 
probabilistic one via an overload and low voltage· security assessment study to identify secure 
regions of .operation or a secure facility planning for a local area within the IEEE Reliability 
Test System. The results of this comparison indicate that the probabilistic approach offers 
several inherent advantages relative to the deterministic approach. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION · 
1.1 Current Industry Climate 
Today's electric power industry has been restructured. Organizationally, the 
traditional utility company was separated into generation, transmission and distribution 
companies. What was mainly the domain of utility personnel now involves people who 
· represent the interests of many diverse parties. The nature and need of these parties are varied 
since they may be system operators, transmission owners, sellers, brokers, end customers, or 
other related personnel. An important end-result of this restructuring is that the various 
players are highly profit motivated in contrast to the regulated, fixed rate of return system, 
utilities of the past. 
One important characteristic of the open market is that their customers are not limited 
in choice of supplies; they can select which company to provide the service they need. This 
decision is made based on evaluation of their own economic situation; 
The competitive environment has provided incentives for long distance transmission 
of energy; in addition, there are disincentives for making high capital investments associated 
with building new transmission equipment. Therefore, the power system is expected to 
operate under highly stressed conditions, making the network more vulnerable. Uncertainty 
of load patterns, unpredictable responses from parties, fluctuation of market demand and 
supply, brings great complexity in maintaining reliability of the system. High uncertainty is 
viewed as a characteristic of the modern power system, and obtaining, managing and using 
large amounts of information is prerequisite to handling this uncertainty. 
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The security level is a serious concern under restructuring. Maintaining sufficient 
security levels· is essential to enjoy the benefits of competition. However, it is not easy to 
define what is meant by "sufficient". Deterministic assessment strategies used to evolve in a 
different industry environment a~d this fact motivates one to question whether they are 
appropriate today. On the other hand, there has been considerable interest in probabilistic 
techniques, and there are reasons why these techniques are attractive today. 
In this thesis, we will examine these two approaches and point out the difference 
between them. We think such a comparison will provide a basis on which to select .one over 
the other. 
1.2 Previous Work 
Although "reliability" is an old concept [1], it has new connotations today. NERC. 
views that reliability is customer oriented and is composed of adequacy and security [2]. 
Planners prefer to talk about adequacy while operators are more interested in security 
because planners are concerned with long term aggregate effects while operators are 
concerned with instantaneous short term effects. One definition of security was proposed by 
T. Dy Liacco[3][4]. The NERC standard gives a well-accepted definition of security and 
adequacy, which is given below: 
Security is the ability of the electric systems to withstand sudden disturbances such as 
electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements. Adequacy is the 
ability of the electric systems to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy 
requirements of their customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and 
reasonably expected unscheduled outage of system elements. ({2], p3) 
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The determination of the security level, for given operating conditions, traditionally 
has been done using what we call the deterministic method. In this method, an operating 
condition is identified as secure or insecure according to whether each and every contingency 
in a pre-specified set, the contingency set, satisfy specified network performance criteria, the 
· performance evaluation criteria. The deterministic method provides a very simple rule for use 
in making this decision: optimize economy within hard constraints of the secure operational 
region. It deals with uncertainty by making decisions based on the most severe, credible set 
of conditions. It is this simplicity that has made the deterministic. method so attractive, and so 
useful, in the past. Today, however, with the industry's emphasis on economic competition, 
and with the associated increased network vulnerability, there is a growing recognition that 
this simplicity also carries with it significant subjectivity, and this can result in constraints 
that are not uniform with respect. to the security level. This suggests that the ultimate 
decisions that are made may not be the "best" ones. 
It is well known that probabilistic methods constitute. powerful tools for use in 
many kinds of decision-making problems. Therefore, today there is a great deal of interest 
in using them to enhance the security-economy decision making problem. The probabilistic 
security assessment deals with uncertainty by representing it using probability distribution. 
However, the probabilistic method seems to be less attractive because it requires more data 
· and it is less understood in comparison to deterministic methods. 
In spite of the attractive features of the deterministic assessment and the difficulties of 
probabilistic assessment, the latter have recently become of great interest in the industry. 
Some evidence of this is provided in what follows. 
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As the power industry restructures, the Western Systems Coordinating Council 
(WSCC) is on the way to accommodate probabilistic methods [5]. A framework adapted to 
implement probabilistic based reliability criteria (PBRC) for WSCC has been developed and 
it recognizes that the economic risk assessment is an ultimate goal of any reliability criteria. 
A key characteristic of PBRC is taking account of the stochastic and random nature of the 
power system. 
An international task force in CIGRE, which comprises of people representing 
academia and industry [6], reported that "the weakness of the deterministic approach lies 
primarily in the arbitrariness of selecting contingencies for the N-1 tests and of choosing the 
cases for stability studies." They went on to conclude that "the deterministic methods may 
omit important cases and include unlikely ones. So in order to be able to operate closer to the 
power system limits, more refmed methods which offers comparable reliability are needed." 
The IEEE has organized a task force to study the probabilistic aspects of reliability 
criteria. One goal of the task force is to strengthen the reliability criteria by incorporation of 
probabilistic factors within a competitive power market. The scope of this task force is to 
identify how probabilistic methods can be used to enhance the applicability, usefulness, or 
comprehension of existing reliability criteria. The work focuses on reliability criteria 
pertaining to steady state flows and voltages. 
The 1999 IEEE Power Engineering Society (PES) summer meeting was dedicated to 
the topic of reliability. One panel session addressed risk-based dynamic security assessment 
[7-J4]. This concern is focused on: (a) accurate assessment of probability and impact of 
power system instability, including both rotor angle and voltage instability, and (b) 
quantitative indices for measuring power system dynamic performance. 
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Probabilistic approaches have been heavily used for planning purposes. For instance, 
PROCOSE [16-18] was designed by engineers at Ontario Hydro and implemented in practice 
there. EDF's method [19], which is developed by French researchers, is designed for EHV 
system. Another representative program is TRELSS [20-21]. This program, and others like it, 
have been used for years in industry as a planning tool. Although these programs differ in the 
indices that are computed in [22-23], they share the same fundamental features that the 
computed indices are probabilistic. 
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Generally there are · two types of probabilistic approaches: enumeration and 
simulation. Enumeration is attractive in that it is very fast. TRELSS, PROCOSE and GATOR 
[24] are three that have been implemented by utilities. These methods are suited for large 
power networks because of the reduced computation time and storage requirements [25]. 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used for a variety of power system evaluation needs, such as 
generation adequacy evaluation [26], distribution reliability assessment [27], and load 
forecasting [28]. However, Monte Carlo simulation is a time consuming algorithms. In order 
to enhance the computation speed, a number of other techniques, such as parallel algorithm 
[29], cluster algorithm [30], outage screening [31], stratified sampling, and fuzzy techniques 
[32], are incorporated into simulation. In planning, sequential simulation is a nice approach 
because it represents inter-temporal dependencies [33]. 
Very little work has been done for applying probabilistic security assessment in 
operations; however, RBSA (i.e., Risk Based Security Assessment) [34-35] presents a new 
perspective to construct risk indices that can reflect operating characteristics. It is capable of 
assessing line and transformer thermal [36-37], voltage [13] and transient [38] security 
levels. 
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. Although the industry has not reached a conclusion regarding which probabilistic 
metrics are best, there is consensus that using them has potential to improve analysis and 
decision-making. 
1.3 Organization 
Despite the perceived drawbacks of the deterministic method and perceived promise 
of probabilistic methods, we · believe it prudent to proceed carefully in embracing 
probabilistic reliability assessment. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to .compare 
probabilistic reliability assessment with deterministic reliability assessment·. for both 
operating and planning purposes. The comparison is made with respect to the assessment 
results of each method. In order to retain simplicity, we focus on overload and low voltage 
security. Voltage and transient instability will not be addressed, although we believe that our 
general conclusions are applicable to all forms of security problems. 
Chapter 2 summarizes deterministic · methods, drawing on various well-accepted 
standards such as IEEE, WSCC, etc. By r~cognizing the weakness of deterministic approach 
in restructured industry, we can develop the potential of probabilistic approaches with 
intention to strengthen the weakness in the deterministic· method. We also describe the 
deterministic study procedures. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the algorithms employed by several probabilistic applications, 
TRELSS, PROCOSE, EDF's method and RBSA; and we point out significant difference 
associated with the various implementations. In the discussion of this chapter, we propose the 
probabilistic index that is used in following case studies and describe the probabilistic study 
steps. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 provide case studies for operation and planning purposes, 
respectively. In both chapters, the study is conducted deterministically and then repeated 
using a probabilistic approach. Significant differences in procedure and resulting informative 
content are summarized and discussed. Chapter 6 provides the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2. SUMMARY OF DETERMINISTIC APPROACHES 
Although large-scale power outages have not occurred :frequently in the past, 
engineers have tended to design and operate the system with conservatism. This tendency is 
· largely due to the recognition that the consequences of such power outages can be extremely 
severe, resulting in heavy economic loss in terms of lost production, equipment damage, 
responsive corrective actions, and, in the worst case, looting and rioting. 
In order to identify designs and operating procedures that prevent these · kinds of 
outages, engineers use computer models to . study the performance of the power system for 
. outage scenarios. However, because the number of possible outages and the number of 
conditions are very large, only a few are typically selected in order to limit the workload. The 
fundamental criterion used in selecting the outage scenarios to study is that they represent the 
worst-case, credible scenarios. This criterion constitutes the basis for the deterministic 
security assessment approach that will be described in this chapter. 
We begin in section 2.1 by providing a summary of the specific steps taken in a 
deterministic study. A key component of these steps is the disturbance-performance criteria 
which specifies acceptable performance levels for particular disturbance types. Such criteria 
has been formalized in the industry, and we review some of them in section 2.2. In sections 
2.3 and 2.4, we compare the previous regulated, monopolistic, vertically integrated industry 
structure with the industry structure of today and discuss how the change influences the use 
of the deterministic approach. Section 2.5 indi~ates that the probabilistic approach fits the 
needs in stressed power system. 
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2.1 Study Procedure 
In deterministic security assessment, the decision is founded on the requirement that 
· each outage event in the contingency set results in system performance that satisfies the 
chosen performance evaluation criteria. These assessments, typically involving large 
numbers of computer simulations, are defined by selecting a set of network configurations 
(i.e., network topology and unit commitment), a range of system operating conditions, a list 
_ of outage events, and the performance evaluation criteria. Study defmition requires careful 
thought and insight because the number of possible network configurations, the range of 
operating conditions, ahd the number of conceivable outage events are very large, and 
exhaustive study of all combinations of them is generally not reasonable. Consequently, the 
deterministic approach has evolved within the electric power industry to minimize study 
effort yet provide useful results. This approach depends on the application of two criteria 
during study development: Credibility: The network configuration, outage event, and 
operating conditions is reasonably likely to occur. Severity: The outage event, network 
configuration and· operating condition on which the decision is based, results in the most 
severe system performance, i.e., there should be no other credible combination of outage 
event, network configuration, and operating condition which results in more severe system 
performance. [38] 
In this paper, we are explicitly interested in studies conducted for the purpose of 
identifying operation limits for use by the operator. In this case, the study focuses on a 
limited number of operating conditions such as flows on major transfer paths, generation 
· levels, or load levels for a specific season. We call these the study parameters. Application of 
the deterministic approach consists of the following basic steps: 
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1. Develop power flow base cases corresponding to the time period (year, season) and 
loading conditions (peak, partial peak, off peak) necessary for the study. In each base case, 
the unit commitment and network topology is selected based on the expected conditions for 
the chosen time period. The topologies selected are normally all circuits· in service; here, 
credibility is emphasized over severity. Sometimes sensitivity studies are also performed if 
weakened topologies are planned. 
2. Select the contingency set. Normally this set consists of credible events for which post-
contingency performance could be significantly affected by the operating parameters of 
interest in the study. 
3. Identify the range of operating conditions, in terms of the study parameters, which are 
expected during the time period of interest. We refer to this as the study range. 
4. Identify the event or events that "first" violate the performance evaluation criteria as 
operational stress is increased within the study range. We refer to these events as the limiting 
contingencies. If . there are no such violations within the study range, the region is . not 
security-constrained, and the study is complete. 
5. Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range where a limiting 
contingency "first" violates the performance evaluation. criteria. This set of operating 
conditions constitutes a line (for two study parameters), a surface (for three) or a 
hypersurface (for more than three) that partitions the study range. We refer to this line, 
surface, or hypersurface as the security boundary; · it delineates between acceptable and 
unacceptable regions of operation. 
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6. Condense the security boundary into a set of plots or tables that are easily understood and 
used by the operator or planner. Identify solutions (i.e., operating guidelines, new facilities or 
special protection schemes) for violation of the performance evaluation criteria. 
These six steps can be applied for either an operating or a planning study, the main 
difference being the time frames for security-related decisions. In an operating study, the 
decision is · what the operating rules should be, and the basis for the decision is the 
. disturbance-performance criteria specifying minimum · operating requirements. In planning 
study, the decision is how to reinforce the transmission system, and the basis for the decision 
is reliability criteria for system design, which is generally the same disturbance-performance 
criteria as in operating study. 
One may note that the reliability criteria used in the deterministic procedures contains 
significant amounts of margin, e.g., 1) line ratings are estimated based on conservative 
weather conditions; 2) voltage limits are given well above the load's interruption level. 
2.2 Existing Reliability Criteria 
2.2.1 IEEE 
The IEEE standard calculates the transmission line current ratings in this way [39]: 
I= qc+qr+qs 
R(TJ 
(2.1) 
here, qc is the convected heat loss, qr is radiated heat loss and qs is heat gain from the sun. 
In order to obtain the current or MV A rating, IEEE made a number of deterministic 
conservative assumptions about weather and geography conditions, and they are: 
a. wind velocity is 2ft at sea level perpendicular to the conductor. 
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b. ambient air temperature is 40 degree. 
c. line runs in a East-West direction 
d. latitude is 30 degree N. 
e. atmosphere is clear. 
f. average sun altitude is measured at 11 am 
Based on the expression (2.1), the ratings in our case study are computed and their 
results are indicated in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Current Rating in Case Study: 
MVA 175 193 200 208 
I(A) At 138kv 732.1 807.5 836.8 870.2 
I(A) At 230kv NIA NIA NIA NIA 
Rating level Con LTE STE LTE 
in RTS'96 
In the table, Con = Continuous rating; 
2.2.2WSCC 
LTE = Long-time emergency rating; 
STE = Short-time emergency rating. 
220 500 
920.4 NIA 
NIA 1255.1 
STE Con 
600 625 
NIA NIA 
1506.1 1567.8 
LTE STE 
The criteria· of WSCC, Western Systems Coordinating Council, are for the purpose 
of setting forth performance levels of the interconnected systems. Continuity of service to 
loads is the primary objective of the criteria and preservation of interconnected operation 
during disturbances is secondary. 
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Within the framework of the WSCC, reliability criteria may be measured in terms of 
the performance of a system under conditions of stress. The criteria are based on the 
understanding that there should be no loss of load for the common single element 
disturbances. There are disturbances that are credible but unlikely and · it is not feasible to 
protect the systems against islanding or loss of load. The criteria recognize the necessity for 
islanding and load shedding, but they should be under control to limit the adverse impact. 
Uncontrolled loss of load is unacceptable under any circumstance. 
The minimum acceptable level of performance is presented in the disturbance-
performance table, as shown in Table 2.2 [40]. Various disturbances are listed in the second 
column in descending order of frequency and increasing order of severity. 
2.2.3 Other Reliability Criteria 
There are a number of coordinating councils, such as MAIN, MAPP, NPCC, SPP, 
[ 41-43] in North America. Each council has its own reliability criteria that are generally 
similar although minor differences still exist between them. 
MAPP standards state that the system shall be operated at all load levels to meet 
defined unscheduled contingencies without cascading, voltage instability, undamped 
oscillations, violation of transient voltage limits, or service interruptions. MAIN principles 
emphasize that electric systems should be operated such that under credible. contingencies at 
projected customer demand levels and anticipated electricity transfers, system voltages and 
facility loading remain within acceptable limits. According to the NPCC basic criteria the 
bulk power system should be operated within a level of reliability such that the loss of a 
major portion of the system should not result from any reasonably foreseeable contingencies. 
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Table 2.2: WSCC Disturbance-Performance Table: 
Post transient Load within 
Performance Transient Transient 
Disturbance voltage emergency 
Level Voltage Dip Frequency 
deviation rating 
One ' 
generator, 
circuit, Min is 59.6 
A Maxis 25% 5% Yes transformer, HZ. 
DC 
Monopole 
Min is 59.4 
B Bus Maxis 30 % 5% · Yes HZ 
Two 
generators, Min is 59.0 
C Maxis 30% 10% Yes circuits, DC HZ 
Bipole 
Three or 
D more Cascading is not permitted 
circuits 
It is NPCC that advocates that security assessment should be done to ensure the 
system is robust only for selected severe contingencies. This is a different perspective than 
that which motivates the WSCC disturbance-performance criteria. 
2.2.4 Significance of Summary 
We observe in the above summary that the key factors of interest are the likelihood 
and security of the event. For example, Table 2.2 lists events in descending order of 
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likelihood. One notes, however, that for lower likelihood events, the allowable performance 
requirement becomes less restrictive. This is equivalent to having the allowable consequence 
become greater. Thus, if we define risk as the product of probability and consequence, then 
one sees that Table 2.2 ( and other criteria as well) roughly provides a constant risk criterion. 
This leads to the conclusion that the deterministic assessment is founded on probabilistic 
concepts. Therefore, the use of probabilistic assessment methods represents only a change in 
method anci not a significant change in philosophy. 
In addition, one must recognize that the "severity test" approach embraced by NPCC 
does represent a significantly different philosophy. Rather than test for the next most 
constraining, credible contingency, it advocates selection of rather rare contingencies. We 
think. this philosophy is complimentary to both the· deterministic and the probabilistic 
approaches. 
2.3 Why Deterministic Method was Acceptable in the Past 
The electric utility industry has always struggled with the need to identify the optimal 
balance between reliability and economics. In the regulated, monopolistic, vertically 
integrated industry that existed previous to the 1990's, reliability typically received higher 
weight in this inherently dual-objective optimization problem. A main reason for this was 
that there did not exist a significant amount of incentive for utilities to cut costs. With little or 
no competition, high costs were acceptable to the regulator if they improved a "social good" 
such as the reliability level of the systems. Therefore, engineers could pad study results with 
significant amounts of margin to ensure secure system operation at all times. From an 
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· engineering point of view, this was prudent since it was an effective, although expensive way 
to conservatively deal with uncertainty. 
2.4 Weakness in Restructuring Industry 
In today's restructured industry, all participants feel the pressure from the market to 
cut costs and increase revenues. There is high incentive to fully utilize all available 
equipment, and the engineering margin that was once so convenient to employ is being 
continuously reduced. Effects to retain significant amounts of margin are questioned. by those 
who perceive economic penalties as a consequence. Weakly supported reasoning for 
constraining criteria can be challenged in the courts; "engineering judgment" may no longer 
be a valid defense for a decision to curtail an energy transmission arrangement. Rather, there 
is a sense among many in the industry today that more refined, objective assessments are 
needed to facilitate decision-making which simultaneously affects a competitive market and 
the integrity of a critical national infrastructure. It is along this line of thought that 
probabilistic assessment appears promising. 
2.5 Potential of the Probabilistic Approach 
The probabilistic approach shows its potential in several aspects under stressed 
situations. There are several probability features in stressed system. First of all, the time of 
contingency occurrence is random. Second, the consequence of each contingency is 
uncertain. Some events may result in significant loss while others have little impact. Last, 
there are many uncertainties which may impact the system operation, one of which is the 
action of the market. 
17. 
Operators are in more need of a method which can quantify likelihood and 
consequence of contingencies than any time before. This quantification allows operators to 
compare the event risk with the economic benefits. In this way probabilistic methods can be 
utilized in decision-making of operating rules or facility planning. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT 
Despite the widespread acceptance in rhe industry of the "deterministic method as 
described in the last chapter, it is recognized that security assessment involves dealing with 
uncertainty. There has been a large amount of research .invested in developing probabilistic 
techniques for power system reliability assessment, as indicated. by the extensive 
bibliographies [44-47]. Although most of this work was focused on only planning problems, 
there are many ideas in it that apply to both operations and planning. Therefore, in this 
chapter, we review a representative sample of the works. Following this review, we identify 
some basic features that characterize most probabilistic approaches. 
3.1 Summary of Probabilistic Tools for Adequacy Assessment 
Most existing tools quantitatively evaluate the "adequacy" of generation and 
transmission system facilities to serve the load at each load level. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
existing probabilistic assessment tools [24]. From this table we can see that there are 
basically two approaches: Monte Carlo simulation and state enumeration. Because of the 
computational requirements, the simulation approach normally utilizes a linearized (DC) 
power fl.ow solution whereas the fast state enumeration approach can use full nonlinear AC 
analysis. Regarding resulting indices, both simulation and state enumeration are similar in 
that they can give out system or load level indices. The dominant technique utilized in Monte 
Carlo simulation is non-sequential random sampling and this is primarily because sequential 
simulation costs too much time in computation. 
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Table 3.1: Probabilistic Reliability Assessment Tools Overview: 
Program name Technique Load flow Indices 
computation 
PROCOSE Contingency DC System 
Enumeration 
GATOR Contingency AC System and load 
Enumeration point 
SYREL Contingency DC/AC System and load 
Enumeration point 
TRELSS Contingency DC/AC System 
Enumeration 
TPLAN Contingency DC/AC System and load 
Enumeration point 
COMREL Contingency DC/AC System and load 
Enumeration point 
RELACS Contingency DC/AC System and load 
Enumeration point 
SICRET Simulation DC System and load 
point 
CONFfRA Simulation DC System and load 
point 
CREAM Simulation DC System and load 
point 
MECORE Hybrid/Enumeration/ DC System and load 
simulation point 
COMPASS Sequential DC System and load 
Simulation point 
EDF Simulation DC System 
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3.2 . Description of Some Probabilistic Tools for Adequacy Assessment 
3.2.1 TRELs·s 
TRELSS, Transmission Reliability Evaluation for Large-Scale System, uses 
generation and transmission contingency enumera,tion to evaluate the power network 
. reliability [20]. The main ·computational procedure is shown in Figure 3 .1. 
TRELSS is a well. accepted software application because it has a number of attractive 
and realistic features. For example, TRELSS has the ability to model large systems with most 
common components, including tap changing transformers, phase shifters, and switchable 
Select contingencies based on 
load levels over one year. 
i 
Evaluate contingencies using de or 
decoupled power flow 
Rank contingencies based on circuit 
overloads and voltage problems 
i 
Alleviate violations using linear 
programming for optimal remedial 
actions, generation re-dispatch, etc. 
r 
Detect potential violations with/without 
combination with cascading 
1, 
Calculate reliability indices, frequency, 
duration and severity of violations. 
Figure 3.1: TRELSS Computation Procedure 
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shunts. For the purpose of planning, TRELSS can model the entire annual period under 
study, enumerating up to N-6 contingencies with up to 2 circuits or 4 generators out per 
contingency. 
In state enumeration reliability assessment programs, some of the key considerations 
are: contingency enumeration technique, power flow method, remedial action and 
rescheduling philosophy. TRELSS has been compared with another state enumeration 
. method, COMREL [48]. The general results of these two programs are similar, and the 
inconsistencies shown may be rooted in the remedial action scheme and other features. The 
biggest advantage of TRELSS is it has more powerful functionality. For example, in 
performing the contingency enumeration, there are seven different user-selected functions are 
normally used: set contingency depth, contingency duplication, probability and frequency 
cutoff, failure level cutoff, contingency ranking and consecutive success, supplemental 
outage selection and load level runs. TRELSS incorporates these seven techniques while 
COMREL only has four. In addition, TRELSS has particular advantages in that it can:· 1) 
rank generator and line outage contingencies based on their aggregate line overload and/or. 
system voltage reduction impacts; 2) represent a full year • · run; 3) eliminate same 
contingencies from subsequent deeper contingency enumeration level if these contingencies 
have caused problems in the preceding level. In AC network solution feature, system 
problems and remedial actions comparison, TRELSS demonstrates more functions than that 
of COMREL. 
However, TRELSS has some .disadvantages. The most important one is that it utilizes 
only ten "snapshots" to represent an entire year's operation conditions. By doing so, 
TRELSS reduces the number of states that ar'2needed to enumerate. A negative 
22 
consequence, however, is that there are a large number of operating conditions that are not 
analyzed. These neglected operating conditions may well represent high risk conditions that 
go undetected. TRELSS also has some weakness in modeling. For instance, high voltage DC 
transmission lines can not be represented in TRELSS. 
3.2.2 PROCOSE 
Probabilistic Composite System Evaluation, PROCOSE, is used to assess the 
reliability of the composite system [16]. Using a state enumeration over one month period, 
the program creates a large number of generation and load levels. The probability of each 
level is calculated. The computation procedure is shown in Figure 3.2. 
PROCOSE assesses the bulk power system adequacy and security accounting for 
generation and transmission failures, load variation, generation economic dispatch, 
maintenance sche_dules and control actions. The adequacy indices the program provides are 
transmission loss of load probability, system minutes of load interruption, system generation 
bottling probability (which indicates the generation in some parts of the system can not be 
committed because of transmission limits), and the expected dollar increase in generation 
costs. 
Advantages of using PROCOSE are that it can handle a number of Demand Side 
Management (DSM) options and that it is capable of modeling hydro-generator reservoir 
constraints. Since the program is primarily for Ontario Hydro usage, modeling reservoir 
constraints is very important. Using the ·hydraulic availability data in combination with the 
load forecast data, the hydraulic generation of each plant is scheduled for every hour in the 
study period. Once the schedule has been determined, the program selects up to 120 
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Dispatch generation in each state to meet the 
system load in the most economical manner 
y Cut loads in proportion 
to the load at every bus 
Use DC power flow to compute active power 
flows for each state and compare them with 
the circuit thermal ratings. 
Stop 
Figure 3.2 PROCOSE Computation Procedure 
representative hours to be used as the typical load-generation scenarios in a whole month. If 
load forecast uncertainty is considered, the monthly peak is represented with a normal 
· distribution. Users can apply four kinds of DSM models into the program: load shifting, 
efficiency improvement programs, load curtailment agreements and user defined schedule. 
After reading the network, load, hydraulic and thermal generation information into 
the program, PROCOSE creates a set of equivalent load flow states for all the load levels in 
the study period. Thermal generation is then dispatched, and if a violation is detected, the 
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generation is rescheduled and/or load is curtailed according to an optimal generating 
scheduling and load curtailment algorithm.. 
Although PROCOSE can provide LOLP and LOLE, it does not present other indices 
for decision making. For example, if there is a low voltage violation, the users can not know 
which state causes the problem. Another down side of PROCOSE lies in its insufficient user 
options, network modeling and remedial actions. For instance, PROCOSE does not consider 
shunt device switching or phase shifter adjustment in remedial actions. 
3.2.3 EDF's Method 
Researchers in Electricite de France (EDF), developed a method for planning based 
on Monte Carlo simulation [19]. In this method, a random statistical sampling is utilized in 
selection of contingencies and loading condition. The flowchart of this approach is as Figure 
3.3 shows. 
Unlike traditional four security "states" (i.e. normal, alert, emergency, restorative), 
EDF's method incorporates probabilistic notion into state definition by considering the non-
vulnerable state as a state that meets the following criteria: 1) there is no violation under no-
outage condition; 2) none of the events with a probability higher than the selected threshold 
results in any violation. 
By dividing the load into static unsupplied load and dynamic unsupplied load, 
corresponding to preventive loss of load and post-disturbance loss of load respectively, 
mathematical expectations of both kinds of load curtailments are presented as indices. The 
power of this approach is that it can be applied not only for planning but also for the real-
time control of transmission system. For instance, during the real-time control, when the 
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power system is in a _non-vulnerable state, EDF's method considers two types of random 
events: 1) events that are taken into account in the security rules; 2) events that are not taken 
into account in the security rules. If type 1 events take place, all the components can continue · 
to operate. If type 2 events take place, however, the components that violate the limits will be 
taken out of service. 
Randomly sample 
the operating condition 
Perform load flow calculations 
Figure 3.3: 
Optimize the dispatch 
Sort the situations 
Differentiate network 
situations 
Simulate contingencies 
Assess consequence 
Make decision 
Flowchart of EDF' s Method 
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· EDF's method also contributes towards a cascade tripping process modeling. J3esides 
checking the system connectedness, the static stability of generation units and the generation-
consumption balance, it computes the load flow to detect overload. If load flow is beyond the 
emergency limit, the line is tripped. If load flow is between the emergency limit and the 
. continuous limit, the line is tripped with r probability. In practice, r is determined by the 
operator's ability to control his system. 
Another interesting advantage of EDF's method in .planning, related to the current 
market circumstance, is that it is possible to include the economic computations of 
investment choices for power transmission systems. It is based on: 
± Cn +En +Sn +Dn _ V(N) 
n=1 (l+at (l+at 
here: 
Cn is the cost of investments in year n, 
En js fuel costs, 
Sn is the cost of static unsupplied energy, · 
Dn is the cost of dynamic unsupplied energy, 
a is the discount rate. 
V(N) is the user value of the system at the end of the study, 
(3.1) 
However, the major downside of the EDF's method is due to high time cost in 
simulation. In order to reduce the computation time, a combined model is utilized in 
simulation. 
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3.2.4 Sequential Probabilistic Method 
In traditional Monte-Carlo simulation, samples are randomly drawn independent of 
whether the same state was drawn before. Suppose a simulated scenario of a large capacity 
generator on outage is drawn two consecutive days. In sequential probabilistic method (SPM) 
[49, 50], i.e. sequential Monte Carlo simulation, this could not happen since once the unit is 
- out, it could not be brought on-line again for at least one day. SPM accounts for this by 
sampling scenarios instead of states, i.e. SPM does not perform random sampling of time. 
SPM follows a few guidelines: 
1. A sample scenario is drawn randomly to cover a whole study period. 
2. All samples are constrained by deterministic planning such as unit commitment, 
expected load, etc. 
3. The stochastic related schedule is drawn as sequences. 
4. The scenario sampling continues until the objective value is statistically _analyzed. 
In the stochastic modeling stage, SPM must determine the following: 
1. What states can the elements stay at? ( e.g. up/down, good/bad) 
2. How long is the period between state changes? 
3. What is the probability of moving from one state to another? 
In SPM, components are assumed stochastically independent which implies that one 
component life process has nothing to do with another component life process. The 
assumption is necessary because modeling many dependencies between components results 
in tremendous complexity in calculation. 
Operating actions are heavily dependent on historical operations. Operations, such as 
curtailing load, adjusting phase-shifter, switching capacitor, etc, could be viewed as a 
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constrained optimization problem. But it might be complicated when dealing with contract, 
competition and other power market issues. Hence it is necessary to introduce heuristic rules 
as well as mathematics approximation. 
In order to model the actions of operation, SPM assumes that the operator optimizes 
the system by minimizing the cost of the present system operation. In this way the increased 
computation is moderate. However, heuristics must be used whenever reaching the true 
optimum is impossible. 
3.2.4 Compare simulation methods with enumeration methods 
A number of computer programs have evolved to compute adequacy of a bulk power 
system. The program capacities are varied. There are two basic analysis approaches: the state 
enumeration approach, and the Monte Carlo simulation. The programs are different in 
network analysis capabilities, load flow methods, corrective action philosophy and resultant 
indices. Table 3.2 illustrates the comparison of applications using both methods. 
One - to -one comparison of the two kinds of programs is not possible since various 
fundamental differences exist in contingency analysis and reliability calculations. The Monte 
Carlo method may be superior When large number of contingencies are considered, while 
state enumeration is good when smaller number of contingencies are considered. The results 
are not consistent in both of the programs. 
The objective of any state enumeration technique is to minimize the number of 
contingencies to be studied, but at the same time to find an efficient way of capturing the 
most significant outages. This requirement arises due to the fact that evaluating all possible 
contingencies is neither practical nor required. 
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The major advantage of a state enumeration method is that the contingency selection 
algorithm is simple. The shortcomings with this method are that the number of contingencies 
to be evaluated will be vary large when the system is large, and the method does not provide 
an easy approach for a stochastic treatment of system loading. 
Table 3.2: Comparison of State Enumeration with Monte Carlo Simulation 
Program Independent Outages Dependent Outages 
name 
Generator Line 
PROCOSE Unlimited 2 Maintenance outage 
GATOR User specified - 1 User specified -3 User specified 
SYREL 6 6 Adverse weather 
Contingency Maintenance outages 
TRELSS 6 6 Adverse weather 
Enumeration TPLAN 3 3 Line outages & Station 
originated outages 
COMREL 4 3 Line outages & Station 
originated outages 
RELACS User specified User specified Line outages & Station 
originated outages 
SICRET NIA NIA Line outages & Station 
Simulation 
originated outages & 
Adverse weather 
CONFTRA NIA NIA Maintenance outages 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
Program name Computation time Generation Rescheduling reduction 
Contingency sorting 
PROCOSE Probability/freq cutoff To full capacity 
Contingency limit 
GATOR Contingency sorting Unit increase in proportion to its pre-contingency output 
Contingency ranking and 
Unit increase in proportion to SYREL sorting its available reserve 
Probability/freq. Cutoff 
Contingency limit Unit increase in proportion to Contingency TRELSS its pre-contingency output Prob/freq. cutoff 
Contingency ranking and 
sorting Proportional to unit reserve 
Enumeration TPLAN Probability/freq cutoff and size 
Contingency limit 
Contingency sorting 
COMREL Probability/freq cutoff To full capacity 
Contingency limit 
Contingency sorting 
RELACS Probability/freq cutoff To meet the demand 
Contingency limit 
SICRET Strata method Optimum dispatch 
Simulation 
CONFfRA Importance sampling To full capacity 
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In a Monte Carlo simulation, a -random statistical sampling is utilized in both 
contingency selection and loading condition. In other words, the system operating, -loading 
condition, as well as generation and transmission outages are selected randomly. 
Because the accuracy of the Monte Carlo simulation is dependent on the size of the 
sample, i.e. 
V=tl-p) 
np 
here: V= variance, p = outage probability, n = number of trials 
(3.2) 
the computational cost is very expensive. However, the advantage of simulation is that it 
does not depend on the size of the system under evaluation. 
A comparison of the state enumeration approach and the simulation approach has 
been done using two programs, COMREL and CREAM [51]. After the comparison, we see 
' differences in these two results. One factor accounting for the difference is that the number of 
selected contingencies or sampled scenarios are not same. Another factor is that these 
programs require many assumptions, and depending on how their assumptions are made, the 
answers will differ. 
3.3 Probabilistic Tools for Security Assessment 
Recently there are some tools for probabilistic assessment of power system security 
[52]. Risk based security assessment, RBSA, uses a probabilistic method incorporating 
probabilistic nature of power system uncertainties [12,15]. Although the meaning of risk is 
varied to different people, the risk addressed in this work is the expected impact at a future 
time. The risk expression is: 
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here x·t is current operating condition and Im(Xt+1) .is future monetary impact. 
The significance ofRBSAlies in the following aspects, 
(3.3) 
1. RBSA quantifies the impact in form of a rating based, performance based and 
cost based index. 
2. RBSA can· quantify uncertainties associated with occurrence of outage events, 
operating conditions and consequences. In other words, it applies probability 
on fault type and location, load levels, dispatch, overload and· voltage 
interruption. 
3. The timeframe for RBSA application can range from minutes· to years, 
depending on operating or planning usage. 
4. The results ofRBSA can identify which component causes the risk. 
5. RBSA can evaluate the composite risk of all contingencies, including thermal, 
voltage and transient instability. 
6. In planning RBSA provides assessment of the cumulative risk over the 
specified time period with a sequential trajectory of operating conditions. 
7. RBSA can be referenced as a basis for decision makers. 
In risk assessment, one must address probability and impact. Probability analysis is to 
quantify the uncertainties and impact quantifies severity of the outcomes. The severity can be 
expressed in cost-based, performance-based and rating-based measures. In the rating-based 
measure, the violation of any traditional deterministic criteria is equally severe. For example, 
1.0 is assigned for violation and 0.0 is assigned otherwise. In this context risk is actually an 
expectation of the number of violations during that time period. The advantage of this 
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measurement is that it is simple and it couples with the deterministic approach. However, the 
disadvantage is that it does not account for differences in severity. 1 % overload· violation is 
perceived as equally severe as 25% overload. In order to overcome the disadvantage of 
performance-based risk, cost-based risk is generated to express the expectation of the 
economic consequence. But this estimation contains significant uncertainty while it can 
recognize the degree of violations. The performance-based risk provides a magnitude of the 
violations. It is used to express in· amperes the violation beyond the overload limit and in 
volts the violation beyond voltage limit. One contribution of RBSA is that a unified common 
measure of severity is proposed as a common basis for comparison for different types of 
security problems. 
RBSA includes methods for computing risk associated with line overload, 
transformer overload, voltage out of limits, voltage instability, transient instability and 
special protection. RBSA, by giving a composite index, can reflect the overall security level 
for all security problem types. In planning, risk can be accumulated over time into a 
cumulative index. 
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Probabilistic Index in Our Study 
From the analysis of the above probabilistic programs, we can summarize that most 
of these methods have the following common elements: 
1. Contingency list 
2. Probabilistic modeling of uncertainty in operating conditions and load levels 
3. Index evaluation 
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4 .. Evaluation criteria (what is acceptable and what is not) 
In our study, we use them to build the risk expression, 
But the difficulty of the security-economy problem is that there exists significant 
uncertainty associated with it. Consider that we wish to assess the security level of a power 
. system for the purpose of making a decision that will be effective for one time period. We 
denote the present time by t and the future time by t+ 1, the corresponding operating 
conditions by Xt and Xt+l, and the contingency state by E. We desire to identify the security 
level of the future time t+ 1. In the planning context, there is uncertainty related to "present" 
· operating conditions. In the analysis of the next time period, we encounter uncertainty 
associated with possible changes in the operating conditions and in the contingency state. 
These three forms of uncertainty are illustrated in Figure 3.4. We note that each state, 
represented by a circle, corresponds to a particular power flow result. We call the states on 
the left the "initial states" and the states on the right the ''terminal states." The t possible 
future operating condition is denoted by Xt+l,j, and the ith possible contingency state is 
denoted by Ei. 
Based on the above discussion, our probabilistic index is given by: 
T 
Risk(Sev) = LPr[X1 ]*Risk(Sev I X 1 ) (3.4) 
t=l 
Here T is the number of different loading conditions studied and Xt is the operational 
parameters that characterize the tth set of loading conditions. For operating studies, T = 1, i.e. 
only one operating condition is studied at a time and Pr[Xtl = 1.0. Correspondingly there is 
only one· possibility in uncertainty level 1 because we can know Xt very well based on state 
estimation results. For the most refined planning study, T = 8760 hours (1 year) and Pr[Xt] = 
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Figure 3.4: Uncertainties Addressed in Our Study 
1/8760. It is also possible to aggregate the probabilities of similar operating conditions to 
decrease the number of operating conditions which is the approach we will use in chapter 5. 
So expression (3.4) fits both operating and planning purpose. 
The risk term in equation (3.4) is given by: 
Risk(Sev I Xt) = LLPr(E;) *Pr(Xt+t,j I Xt) *Sev(E; ,Xt+1,j) 
i. j 
(3.5) . 
Here, P(Ei) is the probability of contingency i in the next time interval. The events Ei are 
assumed to the Poisson distributed so that, 
(3.6) 
NC 
Pr (E O ) = 1 - L Pr (E J 
i=l 
(3.7) 
Here, Eo represents the normal (non-contingency) state. Pr[Xt+t,j I Xt] is the probability of 
operating condition Xt+ 1,j in the next time period given the operating conditions in time 
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period t as Xt. Assuming we can forecast these operating conditions very well, it is 
appropriate to model the probability with a normal distribution having a mean equal to the 
forecast. In our work, we will assume the variance of this distribution is zero. 
The severity function is given as a sum over all the circuits experiencing overload and 
all the buses experiencing under-voltage, i.e., 
Sev(E; ,Xt+1) = Isev c (Flow c (E; ,X 1+1)) + Isev b (Voltageb (E; ,X 1+1)) .(3.8) 
c b 
Here Flowc(Ei , Xt+t,j) is a circuit power flow under a contingency Ei in the operating 
condition Xt+t,j. Voltageb(Ei, Xt+t,j) is a bus voltage under a contingency Ei in the operating 
condition Xt+t,j. 
It remains to define the individual severity functions Sevc and Sevb. This function 
quantifies the severity, impact, consequence, or cost of the corresponding circuit or bus. It is 
generally uncertain (e.g., what is the cost of a 104% overload?), but there are ways to the ·. 
quantify it very simply, and we adopt two of them for the purposes of our analysis here. 
Violation-based: Sevc is assigned 1 if the flow on circuit c exceeds its rating and O otherwise. 
Sevb is assigned 1 if the voltage at bus b falls below its rating and O otherwise. Therefore, 
when violation-based severity functions are used, the resulting risk computed by (3.5) reveals 
the expectation of the number of violations. In this case, one more level is added to the 
uncertainty graph (Figure 3.4) to address severity. There are two possibility, 0 or 1 in fourth 
level, as shown in Figure 3.5. 
Weighted violation based: The violation-based severity functions do not measure the extent 
of the violation. For example, it would not capture the difference between a 101 % overload 
and a 110% overload, although clearly the latter is more severe and to measure the extent of a 
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violation, we use weighted violation severity functions. The functions we have used for 
overload and for under-voltage are illustrated in Figures 3.6. In this case there are multiple 
severity values at uncertainty level four, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
Other severity functions are clearly possible, and we do not advocate that the ones 
chosen here are best. Rather, we simply recognize that they are simple and yet they do allow 
X1 . x1+1.j Ei 
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present future future 
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Figure 3.5: Uncertainties Addressed in Violation-Based Risk 
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Figure 3.7: Uncertainties Addressed in Weighted Violation-Based Risk 
illustration of the basic features of probabilistic assessment. This is satisfactory since the 
purpose of this thesis is not to arrive at the best probabilistic assessment index but rather to 
compare probabilistic assessment to deterministic assessment. 
3.4.2 Probabilistic Study Procedures 
The probabilistic study procedure follows the 6 basic steps described in the 
deterministic study. The first three steps are similar: 
1. Develop power flow base cases corresponding to the time period (year, season) and 
loading conditions (peak, partial peak, off peak) necessary for the study. In each base case, 
the unit commitment and network topology is selected based on the expected conditions for 
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the chosen time period. In planning study, these conditions are assigned with probabilities 
while they are certain in operating study. 
2. Select the contingency set. 
3. Identify the range of operating conditions, in terms of the study parameters, which are 
expected during the time period of interest. 
However, steps 4 and 5 must be modified to read: 
4. Evaluate the index throughout the study range. Decide on a particular "threshold level" 
beyond which is unacceptable. 
5. Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range that have an index 
evaluation equal to the threshold level. This set of operating conditions constitutes the line 
(for two study parameters), a surface (for three) or a hypersurface (for more than three) that 
partitions the study range. We refer to this line, surface, or hypersurface as the security 
boundary; it delineates between acceptable and unacceptable regions of operation. 
And final step is to condense the security boundary into a set of plots or a tables that are 
easily understood and used by the operator and bring in solutions. 
There are a number of methods by which one can make the decision associated with 
step 4. One simple and cautious approach is to evaluate points on the deterministic security 
boundary and utilize one of these values as the threshold. If we evaluate the index using the 
risk expression as proposed in last section, step 5 results in a contour or surface of constant 
risk. The fact that step 6 does not change means that the operator sees no difference in the 
two approaches. 
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CHAPTER 4. COMPARISON BETWEEN DETERMINISTIC AND 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES: OPERATING STUDY 
An operating study is typically done for a relatively.near-future time- weeks or a few 
. months into the future are typical. The goal of an operating study is to determine limitations 
on one or more operational parameters (e.g., flow, load, generation level, etc.) due to security 
constraints. These limits must be communicated in a form such that they are quickly and 
easily understood by the operator. 
Although planning studies of 1, 5, and 10 years into the future are still ·important, 
there have been recent developments that have resulted in increased frequency of high-
stressed conditions. In a sense, the "edge of the cliff' is close and we feel the need to better 
know where that edge lies. Thus, the managers of control centers have significantly increased 
the staff available to perform the studies so that operators can remain alert regarding the 
vulnerable conditions. 
In this chapter, we follow the procedures described in chapters 2 land 3 for 
performing deterministic and probabilistic studies, as applied to operating studies. We 
perform the studjes using the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS), which is a well-known 
test system for power system reliability analysis [53]~ The first three steps of the procedure 
are the same for both types of studies and are described in section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes 
the remaining steps as carried out under the deterministic approach and section 4.3 describes 
the remaining steps as carried out under the probabilistic approach. Section 4.4 discusses _the 
differences between the two studies, and section 4.5 provides a chapter summary. 
41 
4.1 Steps 1, 2, 3 for Deterministic and Probabilistic Studies 
According to the procedure described in chapters 2 and 3, steps 1, 2 and 3 are 
common to both the deterministic and probabilistic studies. We have used a modified version 
of the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) for the comparison. This system is characterized 
by data reported in [53] with modifications, as indicated in 4.1.1, made so as to contrive a 
security-constrained region. 
Figure 4.1 shows the system. As indicated in this figure, the system is divided into 
three areas. We perform the study from the perspective of area 2. The basic idea is that high 
north-to-south transfer causes significant 
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north-to-south :flow-through in area 2. Within area 2, line 23~ 12 is in parallel with the lines 
23~ 13, 13~ 12 path. Under high north-to-south transfer, outage of a line in either path can 
result in overload for lines in the remaining path and/or under-voltage at bus 11 or at bus 12. 
Preventive control to alleviate the severity of these problems can be accomplished via 
shifting generation from bus 23 to bus 13. 
4.1.1 Step 1 
In step 1, the analyst normally constructs the base case according to the expected 
system conditions. In our case, since we use a test system, we describe the changes that were 
made from the data reported in [53]. These changes were made so as to contrive a security 
constrained region and include: 
• Line 11 ~ 13 is removed. 
• The terminal voltage of the bus 23 generator is set to 1.012. 
• Shift 480 MW ofload from buses 14, 15, 19, 20 to bus 13; 
Bus 14 load changes from 194 to 154 MW; 
Bus 15 load changes from 31.7 MW to 127 MW; 
Bus 19 load changes from 181 MW to 31 MW; 
Bus 20 load changes from 128 MW to 28 MW; 
Bus 13 load changes from 265 MW to 745 MW. 
Total system load remains the same at 2850 + j 580 MV A. 
• Add generation capacity at buses 1 (100 MW unit), 7 ( 100 MW unit), 15 (100 unit and 
155 MW unit), 23 (155 MW unit). 
43 
• Change the outage rate of line 12~ 23 from 0.52 to 0.1 so that outage rates of line 13~ 23 
and line 12~23 have significant difference. 
4.1.2 Step 2 
In step 2, because the study is performed from the perspective of area 2, the 
contingency set is limited to N-1 contingencies anywhere in the system that cause violations 
. in area 2. The contingency set includes circuit outage as well as generator outage, as 
indicated below, 
• Circuit outage contingencies studied_;_ 
12~23 out; 13~23 out; 12~13out; 15~24 out; 14~11 out; 20~23 out; 14~16 out; 
12~ 9 out; 12~ 10 out. 
• Generator outage contingencies studied: 
350 MW unit at bus 23; 197 MW unit at bus 13; 400 MW unit at bus 21; 100 MW unit at 
bus 7. 
4'.1.3 Step 3 
Step 3 requires operators to choose pre-contingency operating parameters for use in 
characterizing the security level of area 2. We have chosen the two parameters as the total 
north-to-south transfer and the generation at bus 23. The total north-to-south transfer is the 
power that must flow across the four north-to-south transmission paths, two of which are in 
area 2. The bus 23 generation can be used to shift generation from bus 23 to bus 13. Since 
bus 13 is closer to the load centers in area 1, shifting generating from bus 23 to bus 13 
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reduces severity of overloads and under-voltage caused by the outages. The ranges for these 
two parameters are constrained by the generator capacity in the study system and they are: 
1. Generation at bus 23: 303 MW - 803 MW. 
2. North-South flow: 455 MW - 955 MW. 
The changes to each parameter are made according to: 
f:.p - t:,.p area3 - - areal 
4.2 Step 4, 5 for Deterministic Methods 
4.2.1 Step 4 
{4.1) 
(4.2) 
The task of. step 4 is to identify limiting contingencies. We first set up the 
performance evaluation criteria as following, 
• Pre-contingency bus voltage should be at least 0.98 
• Post-contingency bus voltage should be at least 0.95. 
• Pre-contingency circuit flow should not exceed its continuous rating. 
• Post-contingency circuit flow should not exceed its emergency rating. 
We have identified four limits within the study range. They are, 
1. Post-contingency overload limit of line 13~23 due to contingency 12~23 outage. 
2. Post-contingency voltage limit of bus 12 due to contingency 13~23 outage. 
3. Post-contingency overload limit of line 12~23 due to contingency 13~23 outage. 
4. Pre-contingency voltage limit of bus 11. 
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4.2.S Step S 
In step 5, we need to identify a line as security boundary in the space of the selected 
pre-contingency operating parameters. When this security boundary is displayed graphically, 
it is called a nomogram. A nomogram characterizes the operating limits in terms of specific 
system parameters that affect system security. These parameters could be power flows 
between buses, voltage magnitudes, generator real power levels, etc. A nomogram delineates 
secure and insecure operating regions by the boundary. Usually, those operating points 
within the boundary are secure while the operating points outside the boundary are insecure. 
Nomograms facilitate visual boundary identification by the operator. Figure 4.2 shows a two 
dimensional illustration where Xl, X2 might be two different line flows and Ll, L2, L3 
might be voltage limits, overload limits and or other kinds of pre-contingency parameters. 
Xl 
Ll UNSECURE .AREA 
L2 
SECORE .AREA 
X2 
Figure 4.2: lliustrative Nomogram 
An operating limit may be identified and enforced for "normal" or no-contingency 
conditions. An operating limit may also be identified and enforced for contingency 
conditions. Normally, the latter is more restrictive ·than the former, but not always. However, 
vvhen constructing a nomogram, they are both ·portrayed in space of pre-contingency 
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parameters. This is done because it is the pre-contingency information that the operation is to 
monitor and control. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates limits for different problems. Three of them are post-
contingency limits as follows: 
1. Post-contingency overload limit of line 13~23 due to contingency 12~23 outage. 
2. Post-contingency voltage limit of bus 12 due to contingency 13~23 outage. 
3. Post-contingency overload limit of line 12~23 due to contingency 13~23 outage. 
The fourth one is a pre-contingency problem due to a low voltage at bus 11. In what follows, 
we will assume this constraint is either ignored or it is alleviated in some fashion. This 
assumption will allow us to look more clearly at the influence of the contingency constraints, 
which is the main interest of this thesis. Figure 4.4 illustrates the same three contingencies 
limits without the pre-contingency limit. 
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Figure 4.4: Deterministic Boundary Excluding Pre-Contingency Limit 
The most restrictive limits ·are: 
1. 13~23 post-contingency overload. 
2. 12~23 post-contingency overload. 
These two limits comprise the deterministic boundary as indicated by the bold lines in 
Figure 4.4. 
4.3 Step 4, 5 for Probabilistic Methods 
4.3.1 Step 4 
In this step, we evaluate the probabilistic indices within the study region. Here, we 
use equations (4.3) and (4.4) as proposed in chapter 3, i.e., 
i j 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
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We have assumed that the operating condition observed at time t remains the same 
throughout the next time interval so that Xr = Xr+1, j , and there is no uncertainty in this, i.e., j 
= 1 only. Therefore equation (1) becomes: 
(4.5) 
In the case study, we are interested in thermal and voltage violations and there are 
three violations in the test system, 
• SevJFlowJE1 )) : Impact on component 1 (line 12~23) due to contingency 1 (outage of 
line 12~23); 
• SevJFlowJEJ): Impact on component 2 (line 13~23) due to contingency 2 (outage of 
line 13~23); 
• Sevb (Voltageb (Ei)): Impact on component 3 (bus 12) due to contingency 2 (outage of 
line 13~23). 
A. Violation-based risk: 
In violation-based risk, the severity function given by equation 4.4 is evaluated on 
either 0 or 1. 
The following provides the detailed calculation procedure. Table 4.1 presents 
probability of each contingency, and the probability of contingency i is calculated according 
to equations (3.6). i.e.: 
(4.6) 
The probabilities of event 1 and event 2 (i.e., outage of line 12~23 and outage of line 13~23) 
happening in the next hour are 0.11*104 , 0.59* 104 , respectively. 
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. Table 4.1: Outage Probability of Contingencies 
Ei A.i Outage 
Contingency 
Probability 
12~23 E1 Ai 0.000011 
13~23 £2 A.2 0.000059 
12~13 E3 0.000046 
15~24 E4 A.4 0.000047 
14~11 Es A.5 0.000045 
14~16 E6 A.6 0.000043 
12~9 E1 0.000002 
12~10 Es Ag 0.000002· 
20~23 E9 -¾ 0.000038 
U350at 23 E10 A10 0.000009 
U197 at 13 Eu A-11 0.000006 
U400at 21 E12 A-12 0.000014 
Ul00at 7 E13 A-13 0.000004 
These probabilities are used in the calculation expressed by equation (4.4) and (4.5). The 
results of these calculations are illustrated · in Figure 4.5 for the violation-based risk. 
When using the violation-based severity evaluation, we obtain zero risk inside the 
deterministic boundary as there are no violations in that region. Figure 4.5 illustrates, 
however, that at and outside the deterministic boundary, risk varies significantly. In the 
figure, violations are represented by dotted lines with different angles. For instance, if the 
total N-S flow is kept constant and the ·generation at bus 23 is increased, we encounter the 
area with vertical lines first, which means there is one single violation in that area. The 
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Figure 4.5: Violation-Based Risk Index 
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probabilities of the events are computed using the frequency data in [53]. Some particularly 
important features to note in Figure 4.5 are: 
1) At the boundary: The deterministic boundary, identified by the bold line, reflects risk 
variation from 0.11 ( PN-s < 830 MW ) to 0.70 ( PN-s = 830 MW ) to 0.59 ( PN-S > 830 
MW). The first and last of these ( 0.11 and 0.70) reflect only the outage probabilities of 
outages 12~23 and 13~23, respectively. The value of 0.70 reflects the sum of these two 
outages probabilities, indicating that at PN-S = 830 MW, on the 
deterministic boundary, both outages result in a violation. This point is a high risk point, 
but the deterministic approach does not recognize it as such. 
2) Outside the boundary: The risk takes on several different values outside the deterministic 
boundary, including 0.11, 0.59, 0.70, and 1.29. Whereas the variation along the boundary 
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is influenced only by the differences in outage probabilities, the variation outside the 
boundary is influenced by the number of different violations that can occur, as well as the 
differences in outage probabilities. 
B. Weighted violation-based risk: 
Violation-based risk results in "lumpy" risk variation with operating conditions and 
therefore we tum to weighted violation-based risk. As a result of our selection of severity 
functions (see Figure 3.6), weight violation-based risk indicates non-zero severity for flows 
and voltages close to but within the deterministic boundary. Figure 4.6 illustrates several iso-
risk curves for weighted violation-based risk assessment within the study range. The points 
along each iso-risk curve are identified using a program function written explicitly for this 
purpose. Given the risk of a normal operating point, this function computes variation in risk 
caused by variation in the two study parameters. We want to automate fast computation for a 
large number of points in the X-Y plane. To do this, we assume that the post-contingency 
performance measures, for each of the 3 contributing problems with, are linearly dependent 
on X, Y, indicated in expression 4.7. 
(4.7) 
Here F;j corresponds to the post-contingency performance measures for contingency j on 
component i for specified values of x and y ; the coefficients Cijx, cijy depend on the 
component i and the contingency j. 
In Figure 4.6, however, it is noted that the right end of iso-risk curve of 0.6, 0.7 and 
0.8 do not decrease monotonically as N-S power flow is increased. That means, if the 
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Figure 4.6: Iso-Risk Curve 
generation at bus 23 is maintained at a certain level, and the N-S flow is increased, the risk 
level is kept at the same value. This problem is due to our severity function definition since 
the severity is kept at 1 when power flow is beyond 110% overload limit. 
The solution to this problem is to change the severity function (shown in Figure 3.6), 
and it is indicated in Figure 4. 7. For each circuit and bus, these severity functions evaluate to 
1.0 at the deterministic limits and increase linearly as conditions exceed these limits. The . . 
modified iso-risk curve based on modified severity function is shown at Figure 4.8, which 
shows that the risk decreases with decreasing bus 23 generation and with decreasing N-S 
flow, which conforms to intuition. 
1 
90 100 
Flowe as % of rating 
53 
1 
0.95 1.0 
Voltagei, in per unit 
Figure 4.7: Modified Severity Function for 
Weighted Violation-Based Severity 
Figure 4.8: Iso-risk curve Based on Modified Severity Function 
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It is of interest to compare the iso-risk curve to the deterministic boundary. Here, we 
see that the iso-risk curve corresponding to 1.3 follows the deterministic boundary very well 
as N-S flow increases from 450 MW to about 820 MW. At that point, the iso-risk curve 
moves well above the deterministic boundary, indicating that the portion of the deterministic 
boundary above N-S flow = 830 MW has lower risk than the other parts of the boundary. In 
Figure 4.8, despite the fact that the most limiting contingency in this part of the deterministic 
. boundary has higher probability than the most limiting contingencies in other parts of 
the deterministic boundary, the risk itself is lower. This risk variation is primarily caused by 
the bus 12 low voltage problem caused by outage of line 13-23. For PN-s < 830 MW, the 
limit imposed by this problem. is in close proximity to the deterministic boundary, as 
observed in Figure 4.5. Therefore this problem will contribute significant risk at the 
deterministic boundary in this range. But Figure 4.5 aiso shows that for PN-s > 830- MW, the 
limit imposed by this problem is far from the deterministic boundary. Therefore this problem 
will not contribute significant risk at the deterministic boundary in this range. It is important 
to note that this problem, which heavily affects the risk variation, has no influence on the 
deterministic boundary itself. 
4.3.2 Step 5 
Similarly, m step 5 we should discuss · the threshold level oil violation-based and 
weighted violation-based risk respectively. If violation-based risk index is used in step 5, the 
threshold is set in a simple way. Selecting one of boundary value, 0.59 in this case, to be the 
threshold. In Figure 4.5 there are two indices along the most restrictive constraints: Risk = 
0.59 and Risk = 0.11 . In other words, both are acceptable indices, which means that the 
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constraint of constant 0.59 index constitutes the security boundary. So the first criteria to 
recognize secure region is that probabilistic index must be less than 0.59. 
When looking closely at -the Figure 4.5, we find that there is an intersection at the 
most restrictive constraint, which is 0. 7. It is a high risk point since it contains two 
constraints and operators would like to stay away from it. So the second criteria is that 
operating point must be at least 50 MW away from any region having probabilistic index ;;:: 
0.7. Figure 4.9 illustrates the probabilistic boundary using violation-based risk index. 
If weighted-violation-based risk index is used, 1.3 is a choice for threshold value 
since its left end is on the deterministic line and therefore, 1.3 risk is acceptable threshold. 
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Actuel risk value is 10-4 ,. the risk value in the plc:t 
.Risk=0.7 
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Figure 4.9: Probabilistic Boundary Using Violation-Based Index 
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4.4 Discussion 
Although the analysis in the last section attributes the risk variation along the 
deterministic boundary mainly to a single security problem, there are in reality a number of 
subtle influences captured by the iso-risk curves that are not by the deterministic approach, 
and any of them can cause significant risk variation. 
1. Effect of outage probability. 
The deterministic approach assumes all contingencies are equally probable, but the 
probabilistic approach distinguishes between them. Thus, there may be some situations 
where a deterministic violation is in fact very. low risk because the outage probability is 
extremely low. There may be other situations where a deterministic violation contributes 
very high risk because of a very high outage probability. 
2. Effect of non-limiting events and problems 
The deterministic approach assesses only the most restrictive event and corresponding 
problems; i.e., it does not recognize the influence on security level of less restrictive events 
and problems. The probabilistic approach is capable of composing risk from multiple events. 
and multiple problems and it reflects the total composite risk and not simply that from the 
single most restrictive event. 
3. Effect of violation severity 
The deterministic approach considers all. violations are unacceptable; this implies that 
all violations are equally severe. But the probabilistic approach distinguishes between 
different severities. Thus, there may be some situations where a deterministic violation is in 
fact very low risk because the violation severity is extremely low. There may be other 
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situations where a deterministic violation contributes very high risk because of a very high 
violation severity. 
A fourth influence suggested by equation (4.3) is that of the uncertainty in operating 
conditions. Although we have excluded this influence from our present study, we have noted 
its influence in other studies [15]. This influence is especially important when small 
variations in operating conditions cause large deviations in performance, an effect that is 
particularly noticeable in voltage analysis. 
4.5 Summary 
A The deterministic boundaries are inconsistent with respect to the probabilistic 
index. 
B. Probabilistic assessment is capable of what is missing in deterministic criteria: 
1. Distinguishing between low probability N-1 events and high probability N-1 
events. This is the fundamental advantage of probabilistic criteria. 
2. Capturing, through summation, the influence on the security level of non.-
limiting events. 
3. Distinguishing between high risk operating regions and low risk.operating 
regions, which gives a quantitative way to evaluate risk. 
4. Quantifying severity of events. 
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CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON BETWEEN DETERMINISTIC AND 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES: PLANNING STUDY 
Power system planning is the process by which system facilities are reinforced, 
upgraded, or added in so as to maintain an acceptable reliability level and provide enough 
flexibility to allow economic operation. There are several key features of planning studies 
which uniquely characterize them, as compared to the operating studies discussed in the last 
chapter. They are: 
1) Time: Whereas operating studies typically assess conditions days to months in the 
future, planning studies are typically intended to assess conditions one or more years 
into the future. One important implication of this feature is that there is significant 
uncertainty in the operating conditions that must be accounted for in the analysis. 
2) Alternatives: Whereas the list of alternatives to consider for solutions to operations 
studies consists of restricting various operating parameters, there are normally not 
reasonable alternatives for planning studies since it is not prudent to plan a restricted 
system. Therefore, planners normally look for design alternatives that enhance the 
system capacity. An important implication of this is that solutions are "lumpy", i.e., 
there are large differences between alternatives in terms of the investment cost as well as 
the effect on reliability rules. 
Traditional power system planning was divided into generation and transmission 
planning. Generation planners would determine future generation capacity needs and then 
work with transmission planners in selecting generation sites and the transmission upgrade 
necessary to serve the generation. The argument of "economics of scale" was often used to 
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justify large capacity units. The most significant uncertainty in this process was load growth. 
However, once the generation was sited, the location of the generation facilities to serve the 
load, and the allocation of load to these facilities, was generally very predictable. As a 
consequence, although load growth uncertainty might change the levels of flow seen in the 
. transmission system, the patterns of flow were also very predictable. This fact, together with 
the size of generation units, made 10-20 year planning horizon reasonable for both generation 
and transmission. 
Under deregulation, today's generation capacity needs are no longer centrally 
planned, as the once vertically integrated utility is now functionally separated. In its place; 
there typically exists at least three kinds of organizations. The system operator/power 
exchange is responsible for security assessment and generation dispatch on a day-t6-day 
basis. The transmission company is responsible for planning and maintaining the 
transmission facilities. Generation planning is done by the market - i.e., any entity, oii 
recognizing an attractive market signal, whose source party can build a generation facility. 
The decentralization of generation planning has resulted in that smaller generation 
facilities and much shorter lead time feature plan conception and operational availability .. 
Most importantly, open transmission accesses and the attractive economics of long distance 
transmission has made flow patterns very unpredictable so that it is no longer reasonable to 
place transmission on a 10-20 year horizon. In fact, there is growing consensus that planning 
horizons may need to be as short as 1 year, and certainly no longer than 5 years. An 
implication of this is that the planning process will likely favor smaller reinforcement 
projects over high investment of new facility projects, as the former are less capital intensive 
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and they provide that the transmission system can be more responsive to the changing needs 
of the marketplace. 
A deterministic planning approach, which bases long-term transmission decision on 
perceived worst-case conditions, is reasonable for the centralized planning possible within 
vertically integrated utilities. Now, however, greater uncertainties, together with more highly 
constrained investment capital, has created much greater interest in using probabilistic 
techniques. 
In this chapter, we will perform a 5 year planning study using both the deterministic 
and the probabilistic approach. The study system· is the same as the system utilized in chapter 
4. We will follow the same general study _procedures outlined in chapter 2 and 3. For the 
convenience of the reading, the procedure for the deterministic study is: 
1. Develop power flow base cases corresponding to the time period (year, season) and 
loading conditions (peak, partial peak, off peak) necessary for the study. In each base case, 
the unit commitment and network topology is selected. 
2. Select the contingency set. 
3. Identify the range of operating conditions, in terms of the study parameters. 
4. Identify the event or events that "first" violate the performance evaluation criteria as . . 
operational stress is increased within the study range. 
· 5. Construct "security boundary". 
6. Condense the security boundary into a set of plots or a tables that are easily understood 
and used by the operator. 
When the procedure is applied in the probabilistic study, it follows the six basic steps. 
However, step 4 and 5 is changed to: 
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4. Evaluate the index throughout the study range. Decide on a particular ''threshold level" 
beyond which is unacceptable. 
5. Identify the set of operating conditions within the study range that have an index equal to 
the threshold. 
Section 5.1 summarizes the first three steps in detemrinistic and probabilistic 
planning studies, which are generally the same for both types of studies except a · slight 
difference. Section 5.2 and 5.3 describe the fourth and fifth study steps for the deterministic 
and the probabilistic studies, respectively. Section 5.4 provides interpretation and explanation 
regarding the differences in the. results and the significance of these differences. A summary 
is given in Section 5.5. 
5.1 Steps 1, 2, 3 for Deterministic and Probabilistic Studies 
These first three steps are used to develop power flow based cases, select network 
topology, select the contingency set and identify the study parameters and their range. 
In deterministic planning we set loading condition at peak level, which is based on an 
assumption that the most limiting contingency would take place at the peak level. 
Statistically speaking, contingencies that occur at peak level have much higher likelihood 
than those at partial peak or off peak load levels. In probabilistic study, however, load levels 
are associated with probabilities. Each year both studies provide the decision made on the 
modified RTS' 96 system which is consistent with the operating study. The planning study is 
performed from the perspective of a planner in area 2. What the planner cares about is the 
violations happening in area 2. We assume violations outside area 2 do not occur. 
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The contingency set consists· of thirteen credible events and they are actually the same 
as we used in operating study. The study parameters are also consistent with the operating 
study: 1) generation at bus 23: 303 MW - 803 MW. 2) North-South flow: 455 MW - 955 
MW. 
5.2 Steps 4, 5 for Deterministic Planning 
5.2.1 Step 4 
In order to identify the limiting contingencies, we need to specify tlie criteria first. 
They include the following three points: 
1. Spinning reserve should be 8 %- 12 % of total load. 
2. There is no overload violation in area 2 under N-1 criteria. 
3. There is no low voltage violation in area 2 under N-1 criteria. 
Year 0 is viewed as base year and year 1 to year 5 performs same procedures which 
can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
As far as solutions of the violations are concerned, they depend on different 
situations. When low voltage violations occur in area 2, capacitors may be added. When 
overload violations occur in area 2, an additional line may be built . 
. 5.2.2 Step 5 
Table 5.1 illustrates the decision process from year 0 to year 5. This table includes 
scenarios, decisions, and corresponding post-decision· for each year. In subitems under 
"scenario", load increase extent and generation increase of that year are listed. After 
increasing the generation, the decision maker needs to check pre-contingency limits and N-1 
' 
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I = I + 1 and I < 6 
N-1 criteria evaluation 
No 
Compare different decisions in terms of 
cost: adding facility, altering contract, 
refraining operating points. 
Implement best decision 
Figure 5 .1 Deterministic Decision-Making in Planning 
post-contingency limits, which are the same as that in the operating study. In the table we 
present post-contingency limits which· are of more significance. If any violation takes 
place, the planner should add facilities or change operating conditions. Here we study on 
influence of adding capacitors or adding an additional line. After that, pre- and post-
contingencies also need to be checked to ensure a safe decision. · 
In the table we can see every year there is a 5% load increase at each bus. But 
scenarios occurring at each year are different. For instance, a low voltage violation happens 
to violate post-contingency voltage constraints at bus 12 in year 1. Since it is a low voltage· 
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Table 5.1: Five-Year Deterministic Decision-Making Table 
Pre-decision Post-
Year Scenario post-contingency Decision Decision 
limits violation violation 
Load 0 
0 increase None None NIA 
Generation Can satisfy 
increase 
Load 5% 
1 increase bus 12 has low Add0.45 per Ncine 
Generation Bus 23 up 55 MW voltage violation unit capacitor 
increase Bus 13 up 102 MW at bus 12 
Load 5% 
increase bus 12 has low Add0.8 per 
2 Generation Bus 23 up 100 MW voltage violation unit capacitor None 
increase Bus 15 up 65 MW at bus 12. 
Load 5% 12~23 is Add anew 
3 increase overload; 13~23 transmission 
Generation Bus 15 up 172 MW is overload line 13~23. None 
increase 
Load 5% 
4 increase None None NIA 
Generation Bus 1 up 100 MW 
increase Bus 7up81 MW 
Load 5% 
5 increase None None NIA 
Generation Bus 23 up 191 MW 
increase 
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problem, it can be solved by adding capacitors. After adding a capacitor of 0.45 pu, the 
deterministic criteria is satisfied. However, in year 2, with another 5% load increase bus 12 
has the same low voltage problem again. This time the deterministic decision-maker suggests 
a larger capacitor of 0.8 pu. 
In year 3 lines 12~23 and 13~23 have post-contingency· violations. Since it is a 
overload problem, it can be solved either by adding a new transmission line or refraining 
operating condition which means losing transmission power profit. In order to tell which 
choice is better, a financial comparison is done to compare cost and profit of the choice. The 
financial comparison for adding a new line is listed in table 5.2. In the table we can see that 
adding an addition line will guarantee our contact of electricity transmission and 
consequently we can make significant profit from that. 
Table 5.2: Cost-Benefit Comparison of Adding a New Line 
Cost Benefit 
Line Additional 
Length of 60 miles transmitted 180MW 
13~23 power from area 
2 to area 1 
$/mile for $126,000 Assumed 
adding a /mile electricity price $70/MW 
new line 
7.56 Assumed 
Cost Million electricity cost $40/MW 
Benefit/hour $5400/hr 
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The one-time investment is 7 .56 million and, if the life time is· assumed to be 30 years 
and if the interest rate is assumed to be 5%, the annual cost is given by: 
Annual cost= 29 7·56 = 0.113 million (5.1) 
~)1+0.05) 29 
i=O 
If the system is expected to experience peak load during 5% of the annual period, the annual 
benefit is: 
Annual benefit = $5400 * 365 * 24 * 0.05 = 2.36 million 
And the annual profit is, 
Annual profit= 2.36- 0.113 = 2.25 million 
We decide to add an additional line because there is economic profit in it. 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
In year 4 and 5, there are no violations of deterministic rules and therefore no need to 
add facilities. 
5.3 Step 4, 5 for Probabilistic Planning 
5.3.1 Step 4 
In this step we evaluate the index within the study range. There are some traditional 
probabilistic indices in the planning paradigm. Two frequently used indices are LOLP and 
BUE, which stand for loss of load probability and expected unserved energy, respectively. 
Other indices are frequency of load loss, duration of load loss, expected unserved demand. A 
common aspect of these indices are they all focus on system supply and demand. However, 
they are not capable of evaluating the component risk. In this case weighted violation-based 
risk may be a good indication. It is introduced in (3.4) - (3.8), and is expressed by: 
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Risk(Sev) = I:Pr[Xr]* Risk(Sev I X1 ) 
t=I 
Risk(Sev IX 1) = L LPr(E;) Pr(X r+I,j IX 1 ) x Sev(E;, X r+I,j) 
i j 
Sev(E;, X r+I,j) =; Sevc (Flowe (E;, X ,+1,j )) + t Sevb (Voltageb (E;, X t+I,j )) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
· Other important benefits of using them is simplicity of usage, consistency with operating 
index (i.e., expression 4.3 and 4.4) and requiring no assumption on load shedding policy. 
We use TRELSS to compute probabilistic index, weighted violation-based risk index 
as proposed in chapter 3. As a matter of fact, TRELSS does not have such a function to 
provide violation-based index. But it can provide intermediate results, load level probability 
. and pre-uniformed severity value. In order to obtain a clear idea on how TRELSS can serve 
this purpose, a closer analysis of TRELSS is presented in the following. 
TRELSS can analyze up to ten load flow base cases. Multiple base cases are provided 
to adequately model a system for an annual period. These cases are scaled to reflect load 
levels and seasonal characteristics. When TRELSS performs reliability computation, a single 
year is divided into intervals and day-types specified by the user. An interval is represented 
in terms of months while day-types are specified as days of the week. 
A bases case can be viewed as a snapshot of the system at its normal state at a time 
point within a given interval/day-type when the hourly chronological curve value equals the 
base case load level. Contingency analysis for the given base case and interval/day-type 
provides a sample of study area failures with the sample being taken at the given load level. 
In this way, single load level reliability indices are computed. Then annual indices are 
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calculated by two major procedures. First, interpolate these indices at intermediate load 
levels. Second, take account of load probability distributions for each interval/day-type. 
Detailed procedures of probabilistic decision-making in planning can be seen in 
Figure 5.2. 
5.3.2 Step 5 
Table 5.3 illustrates the year-by-year study results. Severity-based risk is the criteria 
for decision-making. The table also reflects the post-decision risk. 
I = I + 1 and I < 6 
Yes 
Compute indices of year 0 
Take them as thresholds 
Year I 
Run TRELSS. 
Compute indices of year I 
Compare different decisions 
Implement the best decision. 
Figure 5.2. Probabilistic Decision-Making in Planning 
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Table 5.3: Five-Year Probabilistic Decision-Making Table 
y 
e Scenario Pre-decision risk* Decision Post-decision 
a risk* 
r 
Load 0 Voltage risk: 17. 7 
increase 
0 None NIA 
Generation Can satisfy load Overload risk: 0 
Increase Composite risk: 
17.7 
Load 5% Voltage risk:19.5 Voltage risk: 17 .5 
increase Add0.2 
1 Bus 23 up 55 Overload risk: 0 pu Overload risk: 0 
Generation MW capacitor 
increase Bus 13 up 102 Composite risk: at bus 12 Composite risk: 
MW 19.5 17.5 
Load Voltage 
increase 5% risk: 29.9 Add an Voltage risk: 0 
2 additional 
Bus 23 up 100 Overload risk: line 13 Overload risk: 0 
Generation MW 64.1 ~23 
increase Bus 15 up 65 Composite risk: 94 Composite risk: 0 
MW 
Load 5% Voltage risk: 0 
increase 
3 Generation Bus 15 up172 Overload risk: 0 None NIA 
increase MW Composite risk: 0 
Load 5% Voltage risk:0 
increase 
4 Generation Bus 1 up 100 Overload risk: 0 None NIA 
increase MW Composite risk: 0 Bus 7 up 81 
MW 
Load 5% Voltage risk: 0 
increase 
5 Generation Bus 23 up 191 Overload risk: 0 None NIA 
increase MW 
Composite risk: 0 
*: The risk values in this chapter are 104 * actual risk value. 
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In this study we take the index in year 0, 17.7, as the threshold on the composite risk, because 
the operating conditions in year O are already accepted. In the following years, if any index is 
larger than 17. 7, we must take action to reduce the index to less than 17. 7 by adding 
facilities. On the other hand, if the index is less than 17. 7, the plan is considered to be 
acceptable. Figure 5.4 illustrates a risk index trend in a five year span and it affects the 
decisions by adding a capacitor and additional line in year 1 and 2. 
5.4 Discussion 
weighted 
violation- A• 
based risk 
Adda 
30 ,- capacitor 
20 - I 
10 -
I I 
0 1 2 
Add an 
additional 
line 
I 
3 
I 
4 
Risk 
threshold 
I --
5 Year 
Figure 5.4: Weighted Violation-Based Risk for Planning 
The year-by-year assessment and decisions for the deterministic and probabilistic 
• approaches are presented in Table 5.4. Through the table we can observe inconsistency 
between decisions using the two methods. In year 1, the deterministic method· suggests add a 
large capacitor, but the probabilistic method suggests a smaller one. This difference is due to 
the fact that the probabilistic method assesses over multiple operating conditions while the 
deterministic method only assesses the most severe scenario. In year 2, the deterministic 
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method suggests add another capacitor while the probabilistic method suggests add an 
additional line. This difference is due to the fact that the probabilistic method indicates the 
risk for loads close to the ratings, but the deterministic method only evaluates violations of 
the ratings. 
Table 5.4: Comparison of Decision-Making Using Two Approaches 
Deterministic Probabilistic Deterministic Probabilistic 
observation index decision decision 
Year0 No violation 17.7 None Set 17.7 as 
threshold 
Year 1 1 voltage 19.5 Add a capacitor of Add a capacitor 
violation at bus 0.45 pu at bus 12 of 0.2 pu at bus 
12 12 
Year2 1 voltage 94 Add a capacitor of Add a line 
violation at bus 0.8 pu at bus 12 13~23 
12 
Year3 Overload 0 
violations at line Add a line 13~23 None 
12~23 and 
13~23 
Year4 No violation 0 0 None 
Year 5 No violation 0 0 None 
There are at least five effects that deserve attention, and they account for the 
inconsistencies. 
1. Effect of outage probability. 
The deterministic approach assumes all contingencies are equally probable, but the 
probabilistic approach distinguishes between them. It is possible that a deterministic limit has 
very low risk because the outage probability is extremely low. Although our study does not 
demonstrate it, we believe it can be applied on a general basis. 
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2. Effect of multiple operating conditions 
The deterministic approach would only assess a limited number of cases, and then 
(typically three per year - summer peak, partial peak and off-peak) violations of any one case 
are treated equally likely. However, the probabilistic approach distinguishes between the 
probability of the different cases. Thus, there may be some situations where a deterministic 
violation is in fact very low risk because the operating condition is very unlikely. 
In expression 5.4 the risk is summed over multiple operating conditions Xt and when 
applied in our case study, up to eight base cases may contribute to the resultant risk value. 
We observe that in year 2 there are two operating conditions in which the post-contingency 
performance evaluation contribute to the overload risk, and the probabilities of these two 
operating conditions are 0.09, 0.23. The overload risk is computed as, 
T 
Risk(Sev) = I:Pr[x 1]*Risk(Sev I X 1 ) 
t=I 
2 
= LPr[XJ*LLPr(Ei)*Sev(EPX1+1.J 
t=I i j 
= 0.039*(0.09*0.54+0.23*0.41)*104 
+ 0.006* (0.09 *0.51 + 0.20 *0.41)* 104 
=64.1 
3. Effect of Composing Risk over Events and Problems 
(5.4) 
The deterministic approach assesses only the most restrictive event and corresponding 
problems; i.e., it does not recognize the influence on security level of less restrictive events 
and problems. The• probabilistic approach is capable of composing risk from multiple events 
and multiple problems because the term Pr(Ei) reflects the probability of every event, and not 
simply the single most restrictive event. 
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For example, in year 2 there are both voltage risk and overload risk, 64.1 and 29.9, 
respectively. These two kinds of problems contribute to the composite risk, given as: 
T 
Risk(Sev) = IPr[X 1]* LLPr(E;) *Sev(E;,Xt+1,j) 
t=l i j 
= (0.00641 + 0.00299)*104 
= 94 
4. Effect of Violation Severity 
(5.5) 
The deterministic approach considers all violations are unacceptable and this implies 
that the severity of any violation is equally severe. But the probabilistic approach 
distinguishes between different severities. However, our planning case study does not show 
that, although we believe it can be found in other cases. 
5. Effect of Decision Basis 
Based on probabilistic rules the analyst can quantify the whole decision-making 
process. For example, in year 1, there is a low voltage violation of the deterministic criteria. 
Deterministic decision-makers suggest adding a 0.45 pu capacitor. This decision is heuristic 
and has no clear quantity basis. Decision-makers have no idea as to what extent the low 
voltage violates the limit and how often this may happen. So they have to rely on experience 
to make a decision. However, previous experience does not guarantee a sound decision in 
future, especially in today's highly unpredictable market circumstances. On the contrary, 
probabilistic decisio.n-makers know the exact value of capacity because they only need to 
bring the risk back to the threshold. 
6 Threshold 
Another interesting thought is that what to measure if the risk value in year O is zero. 
The author proposes to go on until find one non-zero risk value in a future year is founded. If 
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some contingencies violate deterministic rules, planners need to add facilities to just satisfy 
the constraints. Then take the risk value as threshold in planning. The principle here is to set 
a risk in an accepted system as a threshold. 
5.5 Summary . 
A. Probabilistic planning results are inconsistent with deterministic planning results. 
In this sense probabilistic criteria provides a perspective different from 
deterministic criteria. 
B. Probabilistic planning methods are capable of capturing what is missing in 
deterministic methods: 
1. Incorporate probability of event. 
2. Consider multiple operating conditions into planning scheme. 
3. Capture the impact of multiple events. 
4. Quantify the severity. 
C. Probabilistic methods can quantify the decisions while deterministic methods 
rely heavily on heuristic data which may not guarantee a sound decision. 
D. Probabilistic criteria should include Non-zero threshold index value which is 
acceptable according to the deterministic criteria. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
A solid comparison between probabilistic and deterministic study methods has been 
done in both operating and planning studies. The probabilistic approach differs from the 
. deterministic approach in that the decisions based on these two methods are inconsistent. 
The deterministic method is actually a "coarse" approach because it can not present a 
quantitative basis for people to make decisions. By solely characterizing the distance from 
the limits, the deterministic criteria fail to provide a value that quantifies how much risk 
operators will have to assume if they operate at a certain operating point. The "coarse" nature 
is due to the fact that the deterministic approach simply utilizes the margin to incorporate 
uncertainties. Although accepted within the pre-restructuring power system, high cost 
induced by the deterministic approach is not acceptable in the competitive market. 
On the other hand, the probabilistic approach has several attractive advantages when 
compared with the deterministic method, and they lie in that the probabilistic approach can: 
• recognize the difference between low probability events and high probability events 
• capture the accumulated impact on the security level due to the most restrictive and less 
restrictive events 
• quantify effect of multiple operating conditions rather than only evaluating the most 
severe scenario 
• assess severity in a quantitative manner 
• · distinguish between high risk operating regions and low risk operating regions 
The probabilistic approach provides quantitative assessment to the subjective feature 
of the deterministic method. The power engineers will find it useful in the decision-making 
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process as a bridge between traditional power system operations and planning procedures and 
economics in current market. 
The probabilistic method do not mean to replace the deterministic method because the 
probabilistic method represents a natural evolution for reliability assessment since it 
quantifies the basic elements, probability and consequence, on which reliability evaluation 
has been based in the past. The full acceptance of the probabilistic method may take long 
time. Jumping from one approach directly to the other would result in confusion and loss of 
credibility. So in practice, we suggest utilities get used to the probabilistic perspective by 
gradually embracing probabilistic approaches into whole the decision-making scheme. 
As a suggestion for the future, the probabilistic approach needs to meet the challenges 
from at least three aspects: data collection, economical evaluation of consequences and 
computational speed. If the probabilistic approach solves these problems, it would likely 
gain more credibility in operational security assessment. 
77 
REFERENCES. 
[1] Lester H. Fink, "Security: Its Meaning and Objectives," Proceedings of the Workshop 
on Power System Security Assessment, p 35-41, Ames, Iowa, April 27-29, 1988. 
[2] NERC, "Reliability Concept: North American Electric Reliability Council," 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1999. 
[3] T.E. Dyliacco, "The Adaptive Reliability Control System," IEEE Transactions 
V.PAS-86, n.5, 1967, p 517-531. 
[4] T.E. Dyliacco, "Control of Power Systems via the Multi-level concept," dissertation, 
Case Western Reserve University, June 1968. 
· [5] Mohammed J. Beshir, "Probabilistic based transmission planning and operation 
criteria development for the Western Systems Coordinating Council," 1999 
IEEE/PES summer meeting penal session for reliability criteria for· transmission 
system operation and planning under restructuring, p 134-139 
[6] CIGRE task force 38.03.12, "Power system security assessment: a position paper," 
June 1997. 
[7] Y. Schlumberger, C. Lebrevelec, M. de Pasquale "An Application of a Risk Based 
Methodology for Defming Security Rules Against Voltage Collapse," Proceedings of 
the 1999 IEEE PES summer meeting, presented at the 1999 IEEE PES summer 
meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security Assessment, Edmonton, 
Canada, p 185-190 
[8] A. Abed, "WSCC Voltage Stability Criteria, Undervoltage Load Shedding Strategy, 
and Reactive Power Reserve Monitoring Methodology," Proceedings of the 1999 
78 
IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting panel 
session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security Assessment, Edmonton, Canada, p 191-197 
[9] AM. Leite da Silva, J. Jardim, AM. Rei, J.C.O. Mello, "Dynamic Security Risk 
Assessment," Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 
1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security 
Assessment, Edmonton, Canada, p 198-205 
[10] J. Momoh, M. Elfayoumy, W. Mittelstadt, Y. Makarov, "Probabilistic Angle Stability 
Index," Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 1999 
IEEE PBS summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security 
Assessment, Edmonton, Canada, p 212-218 · 
[11] S. Aboreshaid, R. Billinton, "A Framework for Incorporating Voltage and Transient 
} 
Stability Considerations in Well-Being Evaluation of Composite Power Systems," 
Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 1999 IEEE PBS 
summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security Assessment, 
Edmonton, Canada, p 219-224 
[12] J. McCalley, V. Vittal, N. Abi-Samra, "An Overview of Risk Based Security 
Assessment," Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 
1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security 
Assessment, Edmonton, Canada, p 173-178 
[13] J. McCalley, V. Vittal, H. Wan, Y. Dai, N. Abi-Samra, "Voltage Risk Assessment," 
Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at the 1999 IEEE PBS 
· summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security Assessment, 
Edmonton, Canada, p 179-184 
79 
[14] V. Vittal, J. McCalley, V. Van Acker, W. Fu, N. Abi-Samra, ''Transient Instability 
Risk Assessment," Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting, presented at 
the 1999 IEEE PBS summer meeting panel session on Risk-Based Dynamic Security 
Assessment, Edmonton, Canada, p 206-211 
. [15] H. Wan, "Risk-base security assessment for operating electric power systems," Ph.D 
dissertation, Iowa State University, 1998. · 
[16] Technical Support Department, Grid Business Unit, Ontario Hydro, "Probabilistic 
Composite System Evaluation, User's Reference Manual," Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 
Oct. 8, 1998 
[17]. B. Porretta, D.L. Kiguel, G.A. Hamoud, E.G. Neudorf, "A Comprehensive Approach 
For Adequacy and Security Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems," IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Vol. 8, No.2, May 1991, p 433-441 
[18] G. Hamoud, "Probabilistic Assessment of Interconnection Assistance Between Power 
Systems," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 13, No. 2, May 1998, p 535-
540, 
[19] J.C. Dodu, A. Merlin, "New probabilistic Approach Taking Into Account Reliability 
And Operation Security In EHV Power System Planning at EDF," IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Vol. PWRS-1, No. 3, August 1986, p 175-181 
[20] Southern Company Services, Inc. ''Transmission Reliability Evaluation for Large-
scale Systems, User Reference Manual for Version 4.0," Atlanta, Georgia, June 1998 
[21] Bhavaraju, M.P., Nour, N.E., Balu, N.J., Lauby, M.G., ''TRELSS: A computer 
program for transmission reliability evaluation of large scale systems," Proceedings 
of the American Power Conference Vol. 54 pt 2 1992 p 1572-1579 
80 
[22] F. F. Wu, Y. K. Tsai, Y. X. Yu, " Probabilistic Steady State and Dynamic Security 
Assessment," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 1988, 
pl-9. 
[23] CIGRE Task Force 38.03.12, "Power System Security Assessment: A Position Paper" 
June 30, 1997 
[24] R. Billinton, Basin Khan,"A Comparison of Existing Computer Programs for 
Composite System Adequacy Evaluation," Canadian Electrical Association Power 
System Planning and Operating Section, Spring meeting, 1989, p 60-69 
[25] R. Billinton, E. Khan, "Utilization of Contingency Selection· Technique in The 
Adequacy Evaluation of A Composite Generation and Transmission System," 
Canadian Electrical Association Power System Planning and Operating Section, 
Spring meeting, 1989, p 1-20 
[26] J. Tome Saraiva, L.M.V.G. Pinto, "Generation/Transmission Power System 
Reliability Evaluation by Monte-Carlo Simulation Assuming A Fuzzy Load 
Description," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.11, No. 2, May 1996, p 609-
695 
[27] Billinton, Roy, Wang, Peng, "Distribution system reliability cost/worth analysis using 
analytical and sequential simulation techniques," IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 13, No. 4, November 1998, p 1245-1250. 
[28] Damitha K. Ranaweera, George G. Karady, Richard. G. Farmer, "Economic Impact 
Analysis of Load Forecasting," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.12, No.3, 
· August 1997, p 611-619 
81 
[29] N. Gubbala, C. Singh, "Models And Considerations for Parallel Implementation of 
Monte Carlo Simulation Methods for Power System Reliability Evaluation," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 10, No 2, May 1995, p 779-787 
[30] S. R. Huang, Y. W. Lin, "Applications of Cluster Analysis in Monte Carlo Production 
Simulation," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 1996, p 
1052-1058 
[31] Guo Yongji, Si Yongjian, Xiao Kai, Yang Huiyi, "Composite System Reliability 
Evaluation based on Monte-Carlo Simulation Combined with Outages Screening," 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 1999, p 785-790 
[32] Tome Saraiva, Joao, Varejao Sousa, Antonio, "New advances in integrating fuzzy 
data in Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate reliability indices of composite power 
systems," Proceedings of the Mediterranean Electrotechnical Conference -
MELECON, Vol. 2, May 18-20 1998, p 1084-1088 
[33] S. K. Agarwal, W. V. Torre, "Development of Reliability for Planning Transmission 
Facilities Using Probabilistic Techniques - A utility Approach," IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Vol.12, No. 2, May 1997, p704-709 
[34] Iowa State University, "Risk Based Security Assessment," EPRI report, December 
1998 
[35] J. D. McCalley, A. Found, V. Vittal, A. Irizarry-Rivera, B. Agrawal, R. Farmer, " A 
Risk Based Security Index for Determining Operating Limits I Stability-Limited 
Electric Power Systems," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.12, Aug. 1997, 
p 1210-19 
82 
[36] H. Wan, J. D. McCalley, V. Vittal, "Increasing Thermal Rating by Risk Analysis," 
PE-090-PWRS-0-1-1998 
[37] W. Fu, J. D. McCalley, V. Vittal, "Risk-based Assessment of Transformer Thermal 
Overloading Capability," Proceedings of the 30th North American Power Symposium, 
Oct.19-20, 1998, Cleveland State University, Ohio, p118-123 
[38] J .. McCalley, V.Vittal, N.Abi-samra, "Use of Probabilistic Risk m Security 
Assessment: A Nature Evolution," CIGRE, 1999. 
[39] IEEE Transmission and Distribution Committee, "IEEE Standard for Calculating the 
Current-Temperature Relationship of Bare overhead conductors," New York, New 
York, November, 1993. 
[40] WSCC, "Western Systems Coordinating Council- Reliability Criteria," WSCC 
publication, Salt Lake City, Utah, March 1999. 
[41] MAPP, Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) System Design Standards, MAPP 
publication, St. Paul, Minnesota, December 1994. 
[42] NPCC, "Basic Criteria for Design and Operation of Interconnected Power Systems," 
NPCC publication, New York, New York, August 1995. 
[43] MAIN, "Transmission Planning and Guides and The Simulation Testing of The 
MAIN Bulk Power Transmission System to Assess Adequacy and Reliability," 
MAIN publication, Lombard, Illinois, November 1994. 
[44] Allan, R.N., Billinton, R., Breipohl, AM., Grigg, C.H., "Bibliography on the 
application of probability methods in power system reliability evaluation," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems Vol. 9, No. 1, February 1994, p 41-49. 
83 · 
[45] Schilling, M. Th, da Silva, AM. Leite, Billinton, R., El-Kady, M.A., Power systems 
"Bibliography on power system probabilistic analysis (1962-1988)," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems Vol. 5, No. 1, February 1990, p 1-11. 
[46] Allan, Ron N, Billinton, Roy, Shahidehpour, S.M, Singh, C, ''Bibliography on the 
application of probability methods in power system reliability evaluation: 1982-
1987," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems Vol. 3, No. 4, November 1988, p 1555-
1564. 
[47] Allan, R.N., Billinton, R., Breipohl, A.M., Grigg, C.H, "Bibliography on the 
application of probability methods in power system reliability. evaluation, "IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems Vol .. 14, No. 1, February 1999, p 51-57. 
[48] M.J. Beshir, T.C. Cheng, AS.A. Farag, "Comparison of Two Bulle Power Adequacy 
Assessment Programs: TRELSS and COMREL," Proceedings of the IEEE Power 
Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference Sep 15-:20 1996, p 
431-437 
[ 49] A.Sankarakrishnan, R. Billinton, "Sequential Monte Carlo. Simulation for Composite 
Power System Reliability Analysis with Time Varying Loads," IEEE Transactions. on 
Power Systems, Vol. 10, No. 3, August 1995, p 1540-1545. 
[501 CIGRE Task Force 13 of Advisory Group 3~.03, "Sequential Probabilistic Methods 
for Power System Operation and Planning," June 1997. 
[51] M. J. Beshir, T. C. Cheng, A. S. A. Farag, " Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation 
and State Enumeration Based Adequacy Assessment Programs: CREAM and 
· COMREL," Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and 
Distribution Conference Sep 15-20 1996, p 438-444. 
84 
[52] . Roy Billinton, Guangbin Lian, "Composite Power System Health Analysis Using a 
Security Constrained Adequacy Evaluation Procedure," IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 9, No 2, May 1994, p 936-941 
[53] IEEE reliability test system task force of the application of probability methods 
subcommittee, ''The IEEE reliability test system - 1996," IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, Vol. 14 No.3 1999, p 1010-1018. 
85 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author would like to acknowledge the effort of my major professor, Dr. James D. 
McCalley, who has given me a large amount of suggestions and instructions of the 
completion of the thesis. Under his guidance, I can conduct the project smoothly and 
fruitfully. 
· I also sincerely appreciate the assistance of Dr. Vijay Vittal, Dr. Hal. Stem, 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and graduate _ school of Iowa State 
University. 
The project is under guidance of an IEEE taskforce in reliability subcommittee. A 
couple of committees have given their valuable discussions. 
I would thank all of my fellow students and researchers in power group, Dr. Ming Ni, 
Dr. Mashiur Bhuiyan, Weihui Fu, Jun Zhang, Vincent Van Acker and others, for their 
support and unforgettable friendliness during my one and a half years in Iowa State. 
Thanks to my wife, Lan Yun, who has been an indispensable part of my life and 
given me her innermost support, I can complete this thesis as planned. 
